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Tattooist v. Tattoo: Separating the Service from the 
Constitutionally Protected Message 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tattooing has become a commonplace practice in the United 
States over the last few decades.1 Celebrities increasingly sport 
visible tattoos, and so does the mainstream American public.2 
Moreover, tattooing is gaining recognition across the country as a 
form of art and is increasingly the subject of museum and art shows.3 
If the tattoo is a piece of artwork, then the process of creating such 
art could be considered protected First Amendment speech. Indeed, 
the past few years have seen scholars arguing for constitutional 
protection of the tattooing process.4 But unlike other types of art, 
tattooing can have serious health consequences for the tattoo 
recipient, including allergic reactions to the ink and serious skin 
infections.5 
To address these health risks, states and cities have implemented 
strict regulations on tattooing. As of 2003, thirty-nine states had 
tattooing regulations.6 Other states have no statewide regulations 
but choose to allow municipal or county ordinances to regulate.7 
These regulations range from mandates concerning the sterilization 
 
 1. Maria Luisa Pérez-Cotapos S. et al., Tattooing and Scarring: Technique and 
Complications, in DERMATOLOGIC COMPLICATIONS WITH BODY ART 29, 34–35 (Christa De Cuyper & 
Maria Luisa Pérez-Cotapos S. eds., 2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. CLINTON R. SANDERS, CUSTOMIZING THE BODY: THE ART AND CULTURE OF TATTOOING 10 (1st 
ed. 1989). 
 4. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OLKA. L. 
REV. 1, 60–61 (2008); Bobby G. Frederick, Note, Tattoos and the First Amendment–Art Should Be 
Protected as Art: The South Carolina Supreme Court Upholds the State’s Ban on Tattooing, 55 S.C. 
L. REV. 231 (2003); Anthony Jude Picchione, Note, Tat-too Bad for Municipalities: 
Unconstitutional Zoning of Body-Art Establishments, 84 B.U. L. REV. 829 (2004).  
 5. Pérez-Cotapos S. et al., supra note 1, at 34–35. 
 6. Myrna L. Armstrong, Tattooing, Body Piercing, and Permanent Cosmetics: A Historical 
and Current View of State Regulations, with Continuing Concerns, 67 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 38, 40 
(2005). 
 7. Id. 
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procedures to be used by the tattooists8 to outright bans on 
tattooing.9 The harshness of some of these regulations has brought 
tattooists to the courts to protect their businesses, claiming that 
tattooing is part of their right to free speech under the First 
Amendment. Their success in the courts has varied widely. 
In reviewing these First Amendment claims, some courts dismiss 
tattooing altogether, holding that the process of tattooing is not even 
symbolic conduct, much less pure First Amendment speech.10 In 
Yurkew v. Sinclair, for example, a federal district court recognized 
that the speech arising from the tattooing process differed 
significantly from the speech embodied in the tattoo itself.11 The 
tattoo was “clearly more communicative” than the process of 
tattooing and, furthermore, the average observer would not view the 
tattooing process itself as communicative.12 Consequently, the court 
found that the tattooing process was “not sufficiently communicative 
in nature” to fall within the realm of symbolic conduct protected by 
the First Amendment.13 
Other courts have treated tattoos as a type of art form—entitled 
to full First Amendment protection—and have given tattooing the 
same protected status of pure speech.14 For example, in Anderson v. 
City of Hermosa Beach, the Ninth Circuit held that because all tattoos 
are forms of pure speech, the process of tattooing necessarily leads 
to pure speech.15 Because the tattooing process leads to pure speech, 
the process should not be separately analyzed as conduct apart from 
the end result.16 The court stated that the act of painting is never 
 
 8. E.g., 410 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-5-1 to 1-5-38 (2010). 
 9. E.g., Julissa McKinnon, Hookah Bar, Tattoo Shop Ban Extended, PRESS-ENTERPRISE 
(Riverside, CA), Feb. 3, 2010, at A5. 
 10. People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (1978); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 
1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980); State ex rel Med. Licensing Bd., 492 N.E.2d 534, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1986); State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 423 (S.C. 2002); Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, Ltd. v. City of 
Norfolk, 72 Va. Cir. 388, 390 (2007); Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of N. Chi., 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 
660 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 11. 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1253. 
 14. Commonwealth v. Meuse, 10 Mass. L. Rep. 661, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 470, at *6–8 
(Mass. Super. Nov. 29, 1999); Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 15. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061. 
 16. Id. at 1062. 
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separated from the resulting painting and so neither should the 
process of tattooing be separated from the tattoo.17 Accordingly, the 
court held that the process of tattooing was pure speech, similar to a 
commissioned art.18 
Thus, whether a court finds tattooing to be protected under the 
First Amendment seems to rise or fall on one issue: whether the 
process of tattooing should be analyzed separately from the message 
conveyed by the tattoo or if the tattooing process and the tattoo are 
inseparable for First Amendment purposes.19 Courts that refuse to 
separate the tattooing process from the tattoo find both to be 
protected speech.20 On the other hand, courts that examine the 
tattooing process independently of the tattoo find that tattooing 
should not receive any First Amendment protection.21 Thus, 
separation plays an important part in the debate because it 
ultimately can determine what, if any, First Amendment guarantees 
tattooing receives. 
After examining the reasons for and against separation, this 
Comment argues that because the speech created by the tattooing 
process belongs to the customer and not to the person who actually 
injected the ink, separation of the tattooing process from the 
resulting tattoo is necessary for First Amendment analysis. Unlike a 
commissioner of art, the tattoo customer determines what message, 
if any, the tattoo conveys. Part II of this Comment gives background 
on the Supreme Court’s treatment of art and symbolic conduct under 
the First Amendment and gives a detailed summary of important 
court decisions on the speech aspects of the tattooing process. Part 
III shows that because the tattooing process does not always lead to 
pure speech and substantially differs from commissioned art, 
separation of the process from the tattoo is necessary. Part IV 
explores the impact of separation on the constitutional protection for 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1059–60. 
 20. Commonwealth v. Meuse, 10 Mass. L. Rep. 661, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 470, at *8–9 
(Mass. Super. Nov. 29, 1999); Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1060. 
 21. People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (1978); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 
1248, 1255 (D. Minn. 1980); State ex rel Medical Licensing Board v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34, 39 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986); State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 423 (S.C. 2002); Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, 
Ltd. v. City of Norfolk, 72 Va. Cir. 388, 390 (2007); Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 
580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
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the process of tattooing and the consequently permissible 
regulations, as well as the impact of separation for other 
collaborative processes that result in communication. Finally, Part V 
gives a brief conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. First Amendment Protections 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”22 What qualifies as speech 
is perhaps best defined, first, by what it is not. Incitement to violence, 
fighting words, libel, obscenity, and child pornography may involve 
speech, but they do not receive any constitutional protection23 
because they are considered low-value types of speech that do not 
further First Amendment values.24 Outside of these categories of 
unprotected speech, any use of words, oral or written, is protected 
under the First Amendment.25 
While words themselves are certainly protected by the First 
Amendment, “the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken 
words as mediums of expression.”26 Artistic mediums that use 
pictures, music, or movement rather than words to express an idea 
are also protected by the First Amendment. Justice Souter has 
declared: “It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within 
 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 23. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the “constitutional 
guarantees of free speech” do not apply when “advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action”); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (stating that obscenity, 
fighting words, and defamation are not protected by the First Amendment); New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that “the category of child pornography . . . is unprotected by 
the First Amendment”). 
 24. “[O]ur society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon 
the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.’” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382–83 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the 
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 194 (1983). 
 25. See U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (holding that generally, “‘the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message’” but that restrictions are permitted in traditionally unprotected areas) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. Amer. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). 
 26. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995). 
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this First Amendment protection.”27 Elsewhere, the Court has called 
paintings and music “unquestionably shielded.”28 Indeed, music, live 
performances, and paintings have received protection in several 
Supreme Court cases.29 But the Court has failed to offer a detailed 
explanation for its protection of art or how art fits within the First 
Amendment.30 The exact level of art’s protection is also uncertain as 
the Court has left open the exact test for the protection of artwork.31 
But, while the Court has not offered any definitive opinion about 
what types of art are protected, clues can be found within the Court’s 
previous decisions. 
In affording First Amendment guarantees to art, the Court seems 
to emphasize the communicative nature of art.32 For example, the 
Court has reasoned that films are included in the First Amendment 
because they “are a significant medium for the communication of 
ideas” that can espouse a particular agenda or subtly mold a viewer’s 
thoughts.33 In defending art as speech, Justice Souter has stated that 
the constitutional protection of art does not rest on any political 
significance but rather on the piece’s “expressive character.”34 But 
although art may generally receive protection for its communicative 
possibilities, no “narrow, succinctly articulable message” is required 
 
 27. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (Souter, J., dissenting). The 
majority did not question whether the live, dramatic performances in question were speech 
under the First Amendment. See id. at 580. 
 28. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 
 29. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music . . . is protected 
under the First Amendment”); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (“[M]otion 
pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical 
and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee.”); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 
115, 119–20 (1973) (“As with pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings, both oral 
utterance and the printed word have First Amendment protection.”). 
 30. Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 104–05 (1996) (“Although the 
Supreme Court has recognized, since at least 1952, that art should receive some first 
amendment protection, it has yet to provide a theory to undergird the assertion, or to make 
clear how much protection art ought to receive.”); Christen Martosella, Note, Refusing to Draw 
the Line: A Speech-Protective Rule for Art Vending Cases, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 603, 608 
(“[T]he Court has never offered a definition for art for First Amendment purposes, nor has it 
fleshed out exactly why art merits First Amendment protection.”). 
 31. Hamilton, supra note 30, at 104–05. 
 32. See id. (“Mirroring the commentators’ approach, the Court tends to protect art only 
to the extent that it is a vehicle for ideas, especially political ideas.”). 
 33. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
 34. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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of an artwork for it to be protected by the First Amendment.35 
Therefore, the First Amendment covers even abstract artwork that 
arguably lacks a distinct message.36 
Lower courts have also emphasized the artist’s intent to 
communicate when analyzing the protection of art under the First 
Amendment.37 For example, in White v. City of Sparks, the Ninth 
Circuit protected a painting “so long as it is an artist’s self-
expression . . . because it expresses the artist’s perspective.”38 Also in 
White, the Ninth Circuit reserved the question of whether “paintings 
that are copies of another artist’s work or paintings done in an art 
factory setting where the works are mass-produced by the artist” 
would receive any First Amendment protection.39 The court’s 
reservation of this question indicates that it was comfortable in 
affording constitutional protection to artwork only when there were 
no questions concerning authorship or the author’s communicative 
input into each artwork. 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that beyond words and 
artistic mediums, conduct may be sufficiently communicative to 
qualify as speech. The Court has noted that “[s]ymbolism is a 
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas.”40 Given this 
communicative value, the Court has protected some conduct as 
symbolic speech.41 But the Court has refused to extend First 
Amendment protection to the “apparently limitless variety of 
conduct” that could be claimed as speech “whenever the person 
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”42 Thus, 
in Spence v. Washington, the Court protected the government’s 
interest in regulating a course of conduct by limiting protection to 
conduct where “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was 
 
 35. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995). 
 36. Id.; see also David Greene, Why Protect Political Art as “Political Speech”?, 27 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 366 (2004) (“However, the Supreme Court has also made clear that art is 
‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment even if it is not so “imbued” with communicative 
elements.”). 
 37. Martosella, supra note 30, at 619–25. 
 38. 500 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 39. Id. at 956 n.4. 
 40. West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
 41. E.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). 
 42. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
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present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was 
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed 
it.”43 Instances of protected symbolic conduct include wearing black 
armbands to protest the Vietnam War,44 taping a peace sign on an 
inverted American flag,45 burning an American flag,46 and marching 
in an organized parade.47 
Even if speech falls within the protection of the First 
Amendment, however, regulation may be permissible. The protection 
of the First Amendment is not absolute.48 Some government 
regulation may be constitutional even though it regulates protected 
speech.49 In determining what types of regulation are permissible, 
the Supreme Court has typically divided regulations of protected 
speech into two categories: content-based regulations and content-
neutral regulations.50 Content-based regulations aim at the content 
of a message and thereby attempt to shut down certain messages or 
viewpoints.51 Content-neutral regulations, on the other hand, “limit 
communication without regard to the message conveyed.”52 These 
regulations are often referred to as time, place, and manner 
restrictions because they aim  
 
 
at regulating the circumstances surrounding the speech and not the 
actual message.53 
 
 43. 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
 44. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969). 
 45. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415–16 (1974). 
 46. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 372. 
 47. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995). 
 48. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). 
 49. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (“Expression . . . is 
subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.”). 
 50. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Regulations, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 54–55 (1987). 
 51. Examples of content-based regulations include laws prohibiting criminals from 
profiting from books written about their crimes, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York 
State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991), and statutes preventing judicial candidates 
from announcing their personal views on legal or political issues, Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 52. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 24, at 189. 
 53. A few examples of content-neutral regulations include bans on signs on public 
property, Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), regulations on 
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Because content-based and content-neutral regulations present 
differing First Amendment concerns,54 the Court uses different tests 
to determine the constitutionality of each. “Content-based 
restrictions are more likely than content-neutral restrictions to 
distort public debate, to be tainted by improper motivation, and to be 
defended with constitutionally disfavored justifications.”55 For these 
reasons, content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.56 
That is, the government interest at hand must be compelling, and the 
regulation must be narrowly tailored to meet this government 
interest.57 Content-neutral regulations can similarly undermine First 
Amendment principles by limiting the “availability of particular 
means of communication.”58 But because content-neutral regulations 
do not distort debate or favor a certain viewpoint, they are subject to 
a lower level of scrutiny.59 Thus, a content-neutral regulation must 
be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest” 
and must “leave open ample alternative channels for communication 
of the information.”60 
Regulation of symbolic conduct, however, is not subject to these 
same standards. Symbolic conduct is not “pure speech”; it necessarily 
combines both speech and nonspeech elements. As a threshold 
matter, a regulation of symbolic conduct must not aim directly at the 
regulated conduct’s expressive elements but rather may impose only 
an incidental limitation on the First Amendment.61 Otherwise, the 
 
the acceptable times and or place to use a loud speaker, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), 
and requirement of a permit for demonstrations on public property, Thomas v. Chicago Park 
Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002). 
 54. Stone, Content-Neutral Regulations, supra note 50, at 72 (“Content-based and 
content-neutral restrictions both threaten basic first amendment values, although they do so in 
different ways.”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (noting that “a content-based restriction on 
political speech in a public forum . . . must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny”). 
 57. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
 58. Stone, Content-Neutral Regulations, supra note 50, at 57; Stone, Content Regulation, 
supra note 24, at 193. 
 59. Stone, Content-Neutral Regulations, supra note 50, at 54. 
 60. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 61. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Michael C. Dorf, Incidental 
Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1205 (1996) (explaining that an 
incidental restriction is subject to heightened scrutiny if it “appl[ies] to speech so 
disproportionately as to suggest that the government is targeting speech” or if the “law 
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regulation is content-based discrimination subject to strict 
scrutiny.62 An incidental regulation of symbolic conduct is 
“sufficiently justified . . . if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction 
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of that interest.”63 In this way, the regulation is 
similar to a time, place, or manner restriction in that it is not seeking 
to limit the message but rather the way that the message is 
conveyed.64 
B. Treatment of Tattooing by Courts 
While several cases have examined whether a tattoo by itself is 
speech under the First Amendment,65 less than ten cases have 
actually analyzed the speech qualities of the tattooing process to 
determine whether it is entitled to First Amendment protection. 
These cases have come down on both sides of the issue. A majority of 
courts have held that the tattooing process, analyzed apart from the 
tattoo itself, was not protected speech or symbolic conduct.66 In 
contrast, by refusing to separate the process of tattooing from the 
tattoo, other courts have held that the tattooing process is protected 
 
penalizes expressive activity”). 
 62. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989) (holding that if the State’s interest was 
related to expression, “then we are outside of O’Brien’s test,” and the regulation is subject to “a 
more demanding standard”). 
 63. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 64. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 298 (“[T]he Park Service regulation is 
sustainable under the four-factor standard of United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for 
validating a regulation of expressive conduct, which, in the last analysis is little, if any, different 
from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ward, 468 F.3d 963 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that a government 
employee’s tattoo was “not a clearly established right” under the First Amendment for 
“qualified immunity purposes”); Riggs v. City of Fort Worth, 229 F. Supp. 2d 572 (N.D. Tex. 
2002) (holding that tattoos are not protected First Amendment speech); Stephenson v. 
Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a tattoo that is only self-
expression is not protected by the First Amendment). 
 66. People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332, 332 (1978); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 
1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980); State ex rel. Med. Licensing Bd. v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1986); State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 423 (S.C. 2002); Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, Ltd. v. 
City of Norfolk, 72 Va. Cir. 388, 390 (2007); Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of N. Chi., 580 F. Supp. 
2d 656, 660 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
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as First Amendment speech.67 
1. Cases that separate the tattooing process from the tattoo 
Although all the cases that separate the tattooing process from 
the tattoo conclude that tattooing is not symbolic conduct, their 
mode of analysis falls into two general camps. Some cases simply 
declare, with little analysis, that the tattooing process is not symbolic 
conduct. The other cases find that tattooing is not symbolic conduct 
because, unlike the tattoo itself, tattooing is not communicative. But 
both groups of cases fail to provide a detailed justification for the 
separation of the tattoo and the process of tattooing. 
Of the cases that separate the tattoo from the tattooing process, 
some hold that tattooing is not speech or symbolic conduct but fail to 
provide support for the holding.68 The court in People v. O’Sullivan 
simply declared that “[w]hether tattooing be an art form . . . or a 
‘barbaric survival, often associated with a morbid or abnormal 
personality,’. . . we do not deem it speech or even symbolic speech”69 
and provided no additional analysis of the speech qualities of 
tattooing. To the court, even if the tattooing process were speech or 
symbolic conduct, the regulation would still be constitutional due to 
the health risks of tattooing.70 Likewise, the court in State ex rel 
Medical Licensing Board v. Brady held that the process of tattooing 
was not protected speech, even after admitting that the First 
Amendment protects a “wide range of expression.”71 To support this 
holding, the court simply cited previous cases holding that tattooing 
was not speech.72 Beyond finding these cases “persuasive,” the court 
did not discuss the issue further.73 The court in State v. White 
continued this trend by proceeding straight to the Spence test 
 
 67. Commonwealth v. Meuse, 10 Mass. L. Rep. 661, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 470, at *6–8 
(Nov. 29, 1999); Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 68. See Picchione, supra note 4, at 843–44 (“In none of the cases the Commonwealth 
cited did the courts inquire into the communicative aspects of tattooing; rather, the cited 
cases—indeed the entire corpus of decisions on the issue—were based merely on the 
conclusory assertion that tattoos are not speech or symbolic speech.”). 
 69. 409 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (App. Div. 1978) (quoting Grossman v. Baumgartner, 254 
N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (App. Div. 1964)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. 492 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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without mentioning the speech qualities of the tattoo.74 In applying 
the Spence test, the court found that the tattooing process was “not 
sufficiently communicative to warrant protections”75 and yet 
provided no analysis for this assertion. 
On the other hand, courts that do provide meaningful analysis on 
this issue mostly find that tattooing is not symbolic conduct because 
it is only the tattoo itself that communicates. For example, Yurkew v. 
Sinclair held that tattooing was “undeniably conduct” that did not 
“rise to the level of displaying the actual image” and simply was not 
as communicative as the tattoo itself.76 The court found no showing 
that the average observer “would regard the process of injecting dye 
into a person’s skin through the use of needles as communicative.”77 
Thus, the court held that the process of tattooing was not symbolic 
conduct.78 Because no First Amendment rights were implicated, 
refusal to rent a booth for tattooing at the state fair survived under 
rational-basis review.79 Similarly, in Hold Fast Tattoo v. City of North 
Chicago a federal district court held that tattooing failed the Spence 
test. To the court, the process of tattooing was “one step removed 
from actual expressive conduct.”80 The court felt that tattooing was a 
mechanism for speech and not speech itself.81 To support this 
assertion, the court likened the process of tattooing to a sound truck, 
in that both are used to convey a message but do not by themselves 
receive First Amendment protection.82 
Significantly, none of the cases that separate the process of 
tattooing from the tattoo discuss the reason for this separation. Even 
the courts that found tattoos to be communicative did not find that 
the tattoo’s speech properties prevented separating the tattoo from 
the tattooing process.83 Nor do these cases even discuss this 
 
 74. 560 S.E.2d 420, 423 (S.C. 2002). 
 75. Id. 
 76. 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1253, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980). 
 77. Id. at 1254. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1256. 
 80. 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980).; Hold Fast Tattoo, 580 F. 
Supp. 2d at 660. 
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possibility. But the cases that do not separate the process from the 
tattoo do spend time examining how the tattoo’s speech qualities 
factor into the decision to whether to separate the two. 
2. Cases that refuse to separate the process of tattooing from the tattoo 
Of the few cases that do not employ a separate analysis for the 
process and for the tattoo, all found that the process of tattooing was 
pure speech. These courts have emphasized the artistic nature of 
tattoos, leading to the conclusion that tattooing is art created by the 
tattooist, and, therefore, pure expression. In Commonwealth v. Meuse, 
for example, the court focused on the current social view of tattoos 
as acceptable and even artistic.84 Considering the social acceptance 
of tattooing, the court held that “[t]attooing cannot be said to be 
other than one of the many kinds of expression so steadfastly 
protected by our Federal and State Constitutions.”85 This ruling was 
later reaffirmed by the same court in 2007.86 
 In a similar vein, the Ninth Circuit in Anderson v. City of Hermosa 
Beach has held that tattoos are pure artistic expression; unlike other 
cases, Anderson used this finding to give a detailed explanation as to 
why the process behind the tattoo should not be subject to a separate 
analysis.87 The court reasoned that tattoos themselves are 
combinations of forms of pure expression, regardless of the choice of 
medium.88 The Spence test is applicable only when a process results 
in conduct that does not always convey a message rather than a 
process that always results in pure speech.89 Because tattoos are 
pure speech, the court reasoned, the process of tattooing should not 
be separated from the resulting tattoo and subjected to the Spence 
test.90 Otherwise, the court suggested, the act of painting could be 
analyzed as conduct separate from the painting itself.91 As with 
other collaborative processes, such as commissioned art or a news 
 
 84. 10 Mass. L. Rep. 661, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 470, at *6–8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 
1999). 
 85. Id. at *8–9. 
 86. Voigt v. City of Medford, 22 Mass. L. Rep. 122 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2007). 
 87. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 88. Id. at 1061. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1061–62. 
 91. Id. at 1061. 
PORTER.PP1 2/8/2013 2:42 PM 
1071 Tattooist v. Tattoo 
 1083 
article overseen by multiple editors, the fact that several people 
contribute to the end result does not revoke First Amendment 
protection.92 
After determining that all aspects of the tattooing process, 
including its business side, are protected speech,93 the court found, 
under a strict scrutiny analysis, that a total ban on tattooing was not 
sufficiently tailored to the significant health interests at issue nor did 
it leave open adequate alternative channels of communication.94 
Having the same symbol on a shirt or other medium is not the same 
message as a tattoo because the essence of the tattoo’s message is 
wrapped up in its permanence and its painful placement directly 
onto the body.95 Thus, the tattoo is not only a more effective medium 
of communication, as a sound truck is more effective than simple oral 
communication, but it also communicates a unique message that no 
other medium can entirely capture.96 For these reasons, the Ninth 
Circuit struck down the city-wide ban on tattooing as facially 
unconstitutional.97 
III. WHY SEPARATION IS NECESSARY 
As established in Part II, courts are divided on whether the 
process of tattooing and the tattoo should be treated as one for First 
Amendment analysis or whether the two should be treated as 
distinct forms of speech. Although the courts that have separated the 
two have not provided much analysis or support, the choice to 
separate is the correct one. Careful examination into the tattoo itself 
and the tattooing process exposes cracks in the foundation of the 
cases that refuse to separate the tattooing process from the tattoo. 
First, because many tattoos lack a communicative function, not all 
tattoos are pure speech. Second, the courts’ comparison of the 
tattooing process to commissioned art is improper given the 
tattooist’s low level of input into the tattoo’s message and into the 
 
 92. Id. at 1062. 
 93. Id. at 1063. 
 94. Id. at 1065–66. 
 95. Id. at 1067 (“[A] permanent tattoo ‘often carries a message quite distinct’ from 
displaying the same words or picture through some other medium . . . .”(quoting City of Ladue 
v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994))). 
 96. Id. at 1067. 
 97. Id. at 1068. 
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aspects of the tattoo itself. For these reasons, courts should  
 
separately analyze the tattooing process and tattoos when 
determining their protected status under the First Amendment. 
A. Tattooing Does Not Always Lead to Pure Speech 
For the courts that choose not to separate the tattoo from the 
tattooing process, the argument is simple. A process that creates 
pure speech, such as writing or painting, is never separated from the 
resulting speech.98 Tattoos are considered art99 or forms of pure 
speech.100 Therefore, tattooing should not be distinguished from the 
tattoo for First Amendment analysis because tattooing is a process 
that leads to pure speech.101 But there is a problem with the 
underlying premise that all tattoos are artistic and thus forms of pure 
speech. Many tattoos are not meant to be communicative and are not 
treated as such by the courts. As a result, the logic of Anderson and 
Meuse falls apart, leaving the correct approach: the separation of the 
tattooing process and the tattoo according to the Spence test. 
1. Tattoos that lack a communicative raison d’être 
While many tattoos are expressive in nature, others simply are 
not. Some tattooees have no communicative motive for receiving a 
tattoo. Perhaps the best example of a nonexpressive tattoo is the 
cosmetic tattoo, otherwise known as permanent makeup. Cosmetic 
tattooing is done around the eyes or lips and gives an appearance of 
eyeliner, fuller eyebrows, or lip liner.102 The common reasons for 
getting a cosmetic tattoo have nothing to do with expression. Many 
recipients of cosmetic tattoos merely “desire to improve their 
appearance” and to “look their best at all times.”103 Besides hoping 
for an aesthetic improvement, cosmetic tattooees choose to be 
 
 98. Id. at 1061. 
 99. Commonwealth v. Meuse, 10 Mass. L. Rep. 661, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 470, at *6–8 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 1999). 
 100. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Jana C. Saunders & Myrna L. Armstrong, Experiences and Influences of Women with 
Cosmetic Tattooing, 17 DERMATOLOGY NURSING 23, 24 (2005). 
 103. Id. at 26. 
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tattooed in order to “decrease the amount of time they spen[d] in 
applying makeup.”104 The desire to look better and to spend less 
time applying makeup has no communicative value. These tattooees 
are not trying to speak with their permanent makeup; they are 
simply trying to look their best. While other types of tattoos can be 
used for a wide range of potential communicative purposes, such as 
proclaiming membership with a group, registering important 
personal events, memorializing loved ones, or even expressing 
passions or hobbies,105 cosmetic tattoos present none of these 
communicative purposes. 
In a similar vein, when asked what the experience has done for 
them, cosmetic tattooees most commonly answer that the cosmetic 
tattoo has boosted their self-confidence.106 Notice that this answer 
does not reaffirm any type of message; rather, it is tied to a perceived 
improvement in appearance. This sharply contrasts the answers of 
recipients of body tattoos when asked what effect the tattoo has had 
on their life. One interviewee described how “[t]hings that were . . . a 
big part of my life[] are now on my body.”107 Another noted that her 
tattoos connect her to others with tattoos and also separate her from 
the non-tattooed population.108 “[T]attooees consistently conceive of 
the tattoo as having impact on their definition of self and as 
demonstrating to others information about their unique interests 
and social connections.”109 Thus, recipients of body tattoos tend to 
believe that their tattoos change their own views and the views of 
others while cosmetic tattooees find changes only in personal 
appearance and self-confidence. 
 
Nor are cosmetic tattoos the only type of tattoos received for 
nonexpressive purposes; they are merely one example. Any tattoo 
may be nonexpressive if the tattooee had no communicative purpose 
in mind. As tattoos have gained in popularity, tattoos could be chosen 
merely as a type of fashion statement that does not merit First 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. SANDERS, supra note 3, at 46–47. 
 106. Saunders & Armstrong, supra note 102, at 27. 
 107. Janet S. Fedorenko et al., A Body of Work: A Case Study of Tattoo Culture, 25 VISUAL 
ARTS RES. 105, 110 (1999). 
 108. Id. at 110–11. 
 109. SANDERS, supra note 3, at 51. 
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Amendment protection as speech. This seems more possible given 
the tattoo’s rise in popularity. 
Further, tattoos are no longer viewed by society as “an act of 
rebellion or deviance, associated with sailors, carnival performers, 
criminals, and other marginal groups in society.”110 In recent years, 
tattooing has become quite popular among the mainstream 
public.111 The data on the subject is quite revealing. “Of Americans 
age eighteen to twenty-four . . . only twenty-nine percent describe 
tattoos as ‘freakish,’ and fifty-three percent find tattoos ‘artistic.’”112 
Middle-class, suburban women are “the single fastest growing 
demographic group seeking tattoo[s].”113 The Pew Research Center 
found in 2007 that thirty-six percent of young adults age eighteen to 
twenty-five have a tattoo and that forty percent of adults age twenty-
six to forty have a tattoo.114 
As tattoos become fashionable, the fashion-forward may choose a 
tattoo for the same reasons they pick an outfit.115 Case studies 
examining the reasons for getting a tattoo find “they look good” to be 
a common reason.116 In one study, almost a third of tattooees 
surveyed “described their tattoos as decorative with no symbolic 
meanings” attached to them.117 Another study found that while the 
majority of tattooees surveyed chose to get the tattoo as a means of 
 
 110. Marika Tiggemann & Fleur Golder, Tattooing: An Expression of Uniqueness in the 
Appearance Domain, 3 BODY IMAGE 309, 309 (2006) (citation omitted). 
 111. Id.; Pérez-Cotapos S. et al., supra note 1, at 29 (“Permanent modifications such as 
piercing and tattooing are old forms of body art that have gained popularity in the last decades 
as a fashion statement, promoted by celebrities.”); see also Frederick, supra note 4, at 250 
(“[T]attooing . . . is believed to be the most commonly purchased form of original artwork in the 
United States.” (quoting Memorandum of Decision and Order for Judgment on Cross-motions 
for Summary Judgment, Lanphear v. Massachusetts, No. 99-1896-B (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 112. Picchione, supra note 4, at 833–34 (citing David Whelan, Ink Me, Stud, AM. 
DEMOGRAPHICS, Dec. 2001, at 1). 
 113. Id. (quoting Hoag Lewis, The Changing Cultural Status of Tattoo Art, 
http://www.tattooartist.com/history.html) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114. THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, HOW YOUNG PEOPLE VIEW THEIR 
LIVES, FUTURES AND POLITICS: A PORTRAIT OF “GENERATION NEXT” 21 (2007), available at 
http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/300.pdf. 
 115. Pérez-Cotapos S. et al., supra note 1, at 31 (“Ornamental tattoos represent the largest 
group and are nowadays accepted as a fashion statement in all the social classes.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 116. Tiggemann & Golder, supra note 110, at 314. 
 117. Fedorenko et al., supra note 107, at 111. 
PORTER.PP1 2/8/2013 2:42 PM 
1071 Tattooist v. Tattoo 
 1087 
individual expression, others chose it merely as a fashion 
statement.118 As one tattooist laments, “Tattooing’s become fashion 
now, it’s become trendy. . . . [W]hether it’s a tattoo or a pair of shoes 
or something, they treat it as the same thing. It’s a fashion 
statement.”119 This idea is reinforced by one tattooee who described 
her neck tattoo as “just very decorative, like a permanent 
necklace.”120 
Perhaps it could be argued that the permanence of a tattoo 
distinguishes it from other fashion choices and makes the tattoo 
naturally expressive, regardless of communicative intent. Fashion 
choices such as an outfit or hairstyle are transitory, easily changed at 
any time. Tattoos, on the other hand, reflect a greater, more 
permanent commitment to the image. But the image is not absolutely 
permanent; it can be removed by costly and painful surgery.121 
Furthermore, other fashion statements can be worn day in and day 
out—almost to the same level of permanence. The wearing of a 
certain necklace everyday does not necessarily raise it from fashion 
choice to expressive statement. 
2. Fashion, self-expression, and the courts 
Fashion choices with speech elements have not been considered 
pure speech but have been examined under the Spence test as 
symbolic conduct.122 Of course, clothes can, at times, communicate a 
 
 118. Vaughn S. Millner & Bernard H. Eichold, II, Body Piercing and Tattooing Perspectives, 
10 CLINICAL NURSING RES. 424, 433 (2001). 
 119. MARGO DEMELLO, BODIES OF INSCRIPTION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE MODERN TATTOO 
COMMUNITY 191 (2000). 
 120. Guy Trebay, Even More Visible Ink, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at G1 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 121. Joe Holleman, “Bad News” of Tattoo Removal Fails to Sway Most Unhappily Decorated 
People, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 23, 2002, at E1 (“Basically, a professionally drawn tattoo 
will take about 18 months to two years to remove, will cost about $3,000 and will require the 
use of numbing cream and over-the-counter painkillers . . . .”). 
 122. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that a 
dress code met the intermediate scrutiny test for regulations of symbolic conduct); Blau v. Fort 
Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that clothing choice is not 
inherently expressive conduct); Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(examining whether the choice to wear a skirt is protected expressive conduct); Long v. Bd. of 
Educ., 121 F. Supp. 2d 621 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (finding that clothing choice is expressive conduct 
protected by the First Amendment), aff’d, 21 F. App’x 252 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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particular message.123 But the Supreme Court has not treated all 
fashion choices as protected speech. Instead, the Court employs an 
individualized test. In Tinker v. Des Moines, students wore black 
armbands to show contempt for the Vietnam War.124 The Supreme 
Court found that in this context, the wearing of the armbands was 
“akin to ‘pure speech.’”125 But the Court did not rule that wearing a 
black armband always receives First Amendment protection.126 
Rather, the Court recognized that this specific fashion choice, coupled 
with its underlying intended message, was indeed symbolic 
communication.127 The Anderson Court noted that the Spence test 
was used precisely because wearing armbands is a type of conduct 
that “can be done for reasons having nothing to do with any 
expression.”128 Thus, if wearing an armband for fashion purposes 
places all wearing of armbands outside of pure speech and into the 
symbolic conduct realm, then the process of tattooing should also be 
considered symbolic conduct. 
Courts have also found that tattoos that solely communicate a 
self expression of individuality do not receive full First Amendment 
protection. In Stephenson v. Davenport Community School District, a 
student was asked to remove or alter her tattoo of a cross as part of a 
school dress-code regulation.129 In determining whether the tattoo 
raised First Amendment concerns, the Eighth Circuit found that the 
tattoo, by the student’s admission, “was simply ‘a form of self-
expression.’”130 In other words, because the tattoo was not meant as 
a message to others, the court placed it outside of First Amendment 
 
 123. “People strive to discover who they really are, and to express their real selves in 
various ways, including the expression of self through the selection of fashion.” Gowri 
Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, 
Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 40 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
See also SANDERS, supra note 3, at 4 (“Fashion, like all other mechanisms of appearance 
alteration, is used symbolically to proclaim group membership and to signal voluntary 
exclusion from disvalued social categories.”). 
 124. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 125. Id. at 505, 508. 
 126. See id. at 514 (stating that the “circumstances of the present case” were a violation of 
the students’ constitutional rights). 
 127. Id. at 505. 
 128. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 129. Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1305 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 130. Id. at 1307 n.4. 
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protections.131 In a similar context, another court determined that 
an earring that went against the school dress code did not receive 
any First Amendment protection.132 In looking to the Spence test, the 
court found that the only message conveyed by the earring was one 
of the wearer’s individuality.133 This message was “not within the 
protected scope of the First Amendment.”134 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of fashion and other forms of 
self-expression under the First Amendment reinforces the idea that 
not all tattoos are pure protected speech. If self-expressive tattoos 
are not protected speech, then a potentially large percentage of 
tattoos would not receive any First Amendment protections.135 
Furthermore, the entire subset of cosmetic tattoos should not be 
covered by the First Amendment due to the lack of a communicative 
intent by the tattooee. Because not all tattoos would receive First 
Amendment protection, separation of the tattoo and the tattooing 
process makes sense and follows the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
processes that do not lead to pure speech. 
B. Tattooing Requires No Creative Input or Communication from the 
Tattooist 
The lack of creative input or expression from the tattooist into 
the tattoo provides another reason for separately analyzing the 
tattoo and the tattooing process for First Amendment purposes. One 
major premise of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anderson is that the 
process of tattooing should not be separated from the tattoo because 
“both the tattooist and the person receiving the tattoo are engaged in 
expressive activity.”136 The court likened tattooing to a piece of 
commissioned art.137 Even though Michelangelo did not choose the 
subject of his painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, it is still his 
masterpiece and, therefore, his speech.138 The same is said for a 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Olesen v. Bd. of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 820, 822 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. One study found that forty percent of tattooees chose their tattoo as a means of self 
expression. Millner & Eichold, supra note 118, at 433. 
 136. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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newspaper writer who receives assignments and feedback from his 
or her editor.139 As applied to tattooing, the court stated that the 
tattoo artist was still rendering art, the tattoo, regardless of whether 
the paying customer had the final say in the design chosen.140 If the 
tattooist and the tattooee were indeed both speaking, this would 
provide a compelling reason to analytically fuse tattooing and 
tattoos. But the amount of creative input and the singularity of the 
speech conveyed by the tattoo distinguish tattooing from 
commissioned art in such a way that invalidates a comparison of the 
two. Unlike a commissioned painting, society views the tattoo as 
almost entirely the speech of the customer. 
1. Amount of artistic contribution 
The cases that refuse to separate the tattoo from the tattooing 
process observe that tattooing has become an art. True, tattooing has 
of late gained recognition as an art form.141 Anderson noted the 
“skill, artistry and care that modern tattooists have 
demonstrated.”142 Tattooing is increasingly the subject of museum 
and gallery exhibitions and is discussed by academics and critics of 
the art world.143 But while the tattoo may be artistic, a tattooist has 
much lower level of creative input into a tattoo than a traditional 
commissioned artist. Indeed, the amount of the tattooist’s input 
varies greatly depending on whether the tattooist performs custom 
work or highly standardized “flash” tattooing. 
In custom tattooing, each tattoo is a unique creation. Input from 
both the tattooist and the customer is expected, and both work 
together to create the exact design for the tattoo.144 But this is not 
the only type of tattooing practiced. In fact, custom-only shops are 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See, e.g., DEMELLO, supra note 119, at 126; Frederick, supra note 4, at 239 (2003) 
(arguing that “[l]ike filmmaking, tattooing is an art form in its own right”); Picchione, supra 
note 4, at 833–34 (discussing that fifty-three percent of Americans age eighteen to twenty-four 
find tattoos artistic). 
 142. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061. 
 143. SANDERS, supra note 3, at 10. 
 144. Fedorenko et al., supra note 107, at 107 (describing how one tattooist’s “customers 
are encouraged to help her create original designs”). 
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the minority of tattoo shops.145 
Flash tattooing lies on the other side of the spectrum from 
custom tattooing. Flash tattoos are generated from “highly 
standardized tattoo designs,” usually found on large sheets on the 
walls of the establishment.146 These designs may be created by the 
tattooist or can even be purchased from other tattooists or “mail-
order tattoo design companies.”147 Indeed, most of the flash sheets in 
contemporary tattoo shops originated in the 1970s or 1980s.148 The 
tattooist traces the tattoo outline from the design onto the skin and 
then proceeds to fill in the outlines with color.149 Due to their 
standardized nature, these types of tattoos seem more like a 
rendered service than artwork. 
Comparing flash tattoos to either commissioned art or to a news 
article presents serious problems because tattooists can tattoo 
without any creative input, unlike a commissioned artist. Typically, 
an artist working by commission is given a subject or theme with 
which to work. The artist’s work may even be subject to correction if 
specific aspects do not match the customer’s expectations. But the 
commissioner of a painting would not provide the outline of the 
image and engage an artist merely to paint by numbers. Likewise, 
while an editor may dictate the subject, tone, length, and viewpoint 
of a news article, the editor certainly wouldn’t provide the entire 
outline of an article for the writer to simply fill in with a few 
sentences and quotations. Nor would an artist buy the outline of 
another artist’s work to recreate the work on another canvas. 
Yet this is what a flash tattooist does. A flash tattooist technically 
would never have to create any original design but could just fill in 
the outlines provided by other tattooists. No original, creative input 
from the tattooist is needed. The tattooist usually does not make any 
creative decision regarding the tattoo’s size, location, coloring, or 
even the design itself. Thus, because these choices are left to the 
customer, little creative outlet remains for the flash tattooist to 
render his or her own expression. 
 
 145. See SANDERS, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that a majority of tattooists describe their 
career as “commercial, rather than creative”). 
 146. DEMELLO, supra note 119, at 8 n.4. 
 147. Fedorenko et al., supra note 107, at 107; see also DEMELLO, supra note 119, at 8 n.4. 
 148. DEMELLO, supra note 119, at 8 n.4. 
 149. Fedorenko et al., supra note 107, at 109. 
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If a tattooist purchases his or her designs from a tattoo design 
company and the company has a copyright on those designs, then 
this would seem to raise questions about the true authorship of the 
tattoo. The Ninth Circuit in White v. City of Sparks explicitly chose not 
to decide whether paintings that were copies of another artist’s work 
would receive any First Amendment protection.150 A flash tattoo can 
be an exact copy of another artist’s work onto a customer’s skin. 
Accordingly, the tattooist’s lack of creative authorship for the tattoo 
raises basic concerns over whether the tattoo should be even 
considered the tattooist’s art, much less whether the tattooist should 
be protected by the First Amendment. 
Therefore, the complete lack of artistic contribution by the 
tattooist in some types of tattooing is a major difference between 
tattooing and commissioned arts. The First Amendment should not 
be stretched to protect a tattooist who had no creative input in the 
formation of the tattoo and only supplied a service. Even the 
tattooists who do create the tattoos themselves lack substantial input 
into the decisions concerning the ultimate message behind the 
tattoo. 
2. Contribution to the tattoo’s message 
Just as the creative input of the tattooist differs from the input of 
traditional commissioned artists, so does the tattooist’s input into 
the message of the artwork differ from that of a typical 
commissioned artist. The entire message behind the artwork in 
question, the tattoo, derives from the customer. A claim that the 
tattooist is the speaker cuts against the intensely personal symbol of 
tattoos, especially given the tattoo’s placement upon the tattooee. 
It is the customer that imbues the tattoo with meaning and not 
the tattooist. The customer comes to the tattooist to affix a message 
to his or her body. There are innumerable reasons for a customer to 
choose a particular tattoo. Some tattoos communicate a connection 
between the tattooee and another. Alternatively, tattoos can be a 
means of identifying with a gang or other group.151 “The tattoo is a 
 
 150. White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 956 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 151. Susan Benson, Inscription of the Self: Reflections on Tattooing and Piercing in 
Contemporary Euro-America, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 234, 245 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000). 
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powerful symbol of affiliation and identity.”152 Tattoos can also act as 
a registration of significant, personal events or a “private diary.”153 A 
vow tattoo expresses “love and commitment” to a significant 
other.154 But tattoos are not received only to show connection to 
others; tattoos are also a means of self-expression, a way to describe 
who the individual is.155 Due to the placement of the symbol onto the 
skin itself, many tattoos convey a message about the tattooee’s own 
body.156 For example, those who have received tattoos have 
described the tattoo as a way of reclaiming the body for oneself or 
even as a “statement of ownership over the flesh.”157 
While these are only a few of the possible motivations behind 
getting a tattoo, they all focus on the tattooee, not the tattooist. It is 
the tattooee who is part of the group. It is tattooee who shows 
dominance over his or her body. The tattooee proclaims love for 
another or records the tattooee’s experiences. The tattoo is displayed 
on the tattooee. The tattooist simply has no automatic part in 
determining the meaning of the tattoo’s message. In commissioned 
arts, even when the artist has not chosen the subject, the end 
product is still regarded as the artist’s message, the artist’s speech. 
This is seen by the court’s treatment of artwork, where art is 
protected speech when it represents the artist’s own expression.158 
Furthermore, tattooists have little-to-no say concerning the 
aspects of the tattoo. The customer is the one to make all of the 
significant decisions concerning the tattoo. The customer may seek 
the tattooist’s advice on such matters, but the ultimate control over 
the design, location, and size of the tattoo is in the hands of the 
customer. These aspects of the design can play into the message 
behind the tattoo. For example, one tattooee had a grenade tattooed 
on his chest “like armour, protecting me from those who’ll break my 
 
 152. DEMELLO, supra note 119, at 12. 
 153. Benson, supra note 151, at 246. 
 154. SANDERS, supra note 3, at 46. 
 155. Benson, supra note 151, at 245. 
 156. See id. at 251 (“What is distinctive in contemporary tattoo practices is the linking of 
such assertions of permanence to ideas of the body as property and possession . . . indeed as 
the only possession of the self in a world characterized by accelerating commodification and 
unpredictability.”). 
 157. Id. at 249–50. 
 158. White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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heart.”159 In this case, the placement of the tattoo was very 
significant to the tattoo’s overall meaning. By controlling the other 
decisions concerning the tattoo, the tattooee controls more than just 
where it is or how big it is: the tattooee actually controls the message 
behind the tattoo. 
It is true, as declared in Anderson, that the choice of medium does 
not factor into whether speech occurred.160 But the choice of 
medium emphasizes the speech of the tattooee over that of the 
tattooist because placing the tattoo upon the skin communicates 
messages about the tattooee’s body. For a tattooist, the medium 
chosen is not dead, unfeeling canvas or wood, but living human 
tissue. Because the medium is the customer, the message must 
belong solely to the customer. 
Part of the message inherent in the tattoo is that the body of the 
recipient is something capable of being controlled.161 Obviously, the 
tattooist does not communicate control over his or her body—the 
tattooee does. Placement of a design upon one’s own body indicates 
a much higher level of personal speech and commitment to the 
message than commissioning a painting. Furthermore, “central to a 
lot of contemporary tattoo and piercing talk is the idea of 
individuation, of the tattoo . . . as ‘a declaration of me-ness.’”162 Thus, 
the unique medium emphasizes that this is the speech of the 
recipient and not the distributor. 
Because the design, size, and even message are chosen by the 
tattooee, the execution of the design is the only possible element of 
speech left for the tattooist. But this is not as communicative as the 
tattoo itself. As the court in Yurkew stated: “Here, even assuming that 
tattooing constitutes an art form, [the] plaintiff’s interest in engaging 
in conduct involving tattooing does not rise to the level of displaying 
the actual image conveyed by the tattoo, as the tattoo itself is clearly 
more communicative.”163 Execution of a design should not receive 
First Amendment protection. Consider, for example, a cake decorator 
who executes a design upon a cake chosen by his or her customer. 
 
 159. Benson, supra note 151, at 246. 
 160. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 161. Benson, supra note 151, at 250–51 (describing a tattoo as a “statement of ownership 
over the flesh”). 
 162. Id. at 245. 
 163. Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980). 
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One would not typically conceive of this work as constitutionally 
protected speech. Cake decorating lacks a communicative purpose 
and, therefore, does not appear to be speech. Likewise, a tattooist 
must have a communicative intent behind the execution of the design 
in order for the act of tattooing to count as protected speech. Since 
the tattoo does not represent the tattooist’s communication, 
execution of the tattoo design should not be protected speech. 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SEPARATION 
Separating the tattooing process from the resulting tattoo may 
lead the process to receive less constitutional protection and, 
consequently, subject tattooing regulations to a more deferential 
standard of scrutiny. Also, a choice to not separate the tattoo from 
tattooing could have significant ramifications for other types of 
collaborative processes. 
A. Speech Content of the Tattoo and of the Tattooing Process 
Separating the tattoo from the tattooing process requires that 
each be analyzed for their speech content under the First 
Amendment. Because some subsets of tattoos are not forms of pure 
expression, tattoos as a whole cannot be labeled pure speech. 
Otherwise, drawing a line between what does or does not constitute 
speech becomes impossible. If all tattoos were considered pure 
speech, then every fashion choice would necessarily also be 
considered pure speech, leading to untenable results. For example, 
wearing a certain color or a shirt with sleeves would become 
constitutionally protected speech. Refusing to label all tattoos as 
pure speech preserves the distinction between fashion choices 
meant to communicate an intelligible message from those that do 
not. Thus, for tattoos, a more individualistic analysis under the 
Spence test must take place,164 and just as the wearing of a black 
armband must be examined to see if the intent behind the action was 
communicative, so must the tattoo be examined for a communicative 
purpose. But even though the tattoo itself should be considered 
potential symbolic conduct, the tattooing process is not symbolic 
conduct but instead should be considered as a medium for others to 
 
 164. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061. 
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speak. 
All of the courts that have separated the process of tattooing 
from the tattoo have held that the process itself did not meet the 
standards for symbolic conduct.165 Most courts have found that the 
process of tattooing failed both prongs: no intent to convey a 
communicable message existed nor would a message be understood 
by an audience.166 Although these courts may not have provided 
much analysis to support their holdings,167 their ultimate conclusion 
was correct. The tattooist is not trying to impart his or her own 
message through tattooing, nor would an audience view the 
tattooing process as the tattooist’s message. 
1. Tattooing does not communicate the tattooist’s message 
First, the tattooing process fails to meet the first standard for 
symbolic conduct because the tattooist does not intend to convey his 
or her own personal message through the tattoo or through the act 
of tattooing. The tattooist also does not communicate through the act 
of tattooing itself. Neither can the tattooist try to claim the tattoo as 
his or her speech. The tattoo is the expression of the tattooee and not 
the tattooist. Additionally, the tattoo’s permanent placement on the 
skin means that no subsequent owners can attach a different 
meaning to the tattoo. 
The act or process of tattooing is not a communication by the 
tattooist. It is difficult to imagine what the injection of ink into the 
skin of another would convey. Likely because of this difficulty, 
tattooists do not claim that the injecting of ink into the skin conveys 
any type of message by itself but instead tend to claim that they 
convey a message through the tattoo. For example, in his brief to the 
Ninth Circuit, tattooist Johnny Anderson argued that “his images are 
expressive and emotionally evocative.”168 
But this claim is misguided because it is the customer who 
 
 165. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 166. Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1253–54 (D. Minn. 1980); State ex rel Med. 
Licensing Bd. v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 
423 (S.C. 2002); Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, Ltd. v. City of Norfolk, 72 Va. Cir. 388, 390 (2007); 
Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 167. Picchione, supra note 4, at 843–44. 
 168. Opening Brief of Appellant at 17, Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 
(9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-56914), 2009 WL 4921598. 
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speaks through the tattoo. The tattooist has no input into the 
message of the tattoo; this is entirely generated by the customer, the 
owner of the tattoo. As previously discussed,169 the customer alone 
determines what the tattoo represents. Since the tattooist cannot 
choose any aspect of the tattoo or the tattoo’s message, the tattoo 
cannot be the tattooist’s speech. 
Additionally, a tattoo differs from a design on other mediums 
because a tattoo permanently resides with the original owner. While 
paintings are frequently sold and traded, tattoos cannot be sold, 
traded, or moved. Once a tattoo is commissioned, it forever resides 
with the purchaser unless the purchaser takes steps to removeor 
cover it with another tattoo. Because the tattoo forever stays with the 
original customer, there is no possibility that a later owner can affix a 
different interpretation or message to the tattoo. The tattoo can 
never have significance beyond what the original owner gives it. 
Thus, the tattooist cannot claim that he or she communicates 
through tattooing since the actual process of tattooing is not 
communicative and any message that the tattoo might carry belongs 
only to the original purchaser of the tattoo. 
2. Audiences and tattooing 
Furthermore, an audience would not view the injection of dye 
into the skin as the tattooist communicating a message, as required 
by the Spence test. Audiences may recognize that tattoos have 
meaning,170 but they would not think of the tattooist as 
communicating by injecting ink into someone else’s skin. Because 
tattoos are considered the tattooee’s speech, an observer would not 
recognize the process of tattooing as a communication of the 
tattooist. The tattooist is not the one declaring “I love Mom” or a 
passion for dolphins. It would seem odd to ask a tattooee what the 
tattooist meant by creating such a design. Questions about the 
meaning of a tattoo are posed to the tattooee, not the tattooist.171 
 
 169. See supra Part III.B. 
 170. See Picchione, supra note 4, at 833–34 (finding that fifty-three percent of Americans 
age eighteen to twenty-four find tattoos artistic). 
 171. For example, studies involving tattoos often involve asking the tattoo recipient about 
the meaning behind his or her tattoo or why he or she chose a specific design. See, e.g., 
Fedorenko et al., supra note 107, at 111–13; Millner & Eichold, supra note 118, at 433; 
Tiggemann & Golder, supra note 110, at 312. 
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The focus is on the meaning of the tattooee’s choices, not what 
message the tattooist intended. Simply put, the tattooee’s speech 
overwhelms any of that by the tattooist. The observer would not 
view a tattooist inking another as the tattooist speaking. Because a 
tattoo’s message focuses on the wearer rather than the tattooist, the 
tattooing process is not symbolic conduct and hence does not receive 
First Amendment protection as such. 
3. Protection for conduct that is not speech but is closely related to 
speech 
Even if the tattooing process is not speech, it might receive some 
First Amendment protection because it is closely related to speech. 
Some courts that have separated the tattoo from the process have 
compared the process of tattooing to a sound truck that “enables 
each customer to express a particularized message, but the sound 
truck vehicle itself is not expressive.”172 But this analogy is flawed 
because a sound truck is just one method to express oneself vocally. 
The sound truck is not necessary for the actual expression itself 
because the message could still be delivered, although in a different 
manner, without the truck. In contrast, tattooing is the only means 
for a customer to express himself symbolically through a permanent 
tattoo. If a city banned the use of sound trucks, individuals could still 
proclaim their messages vocally. If tattooing is banned, no one can 
express herself by receiving a tattoo. Thus, comparing a tattooist to a 
sound truck presents problems rather than solutions. 
Rather than comparing a tattooist to a commissioned artist or a 
sound truck, a tattooist is more aptly likened to a publishing house. A 
publishing house provides a mechanism for those who desire to 
speak to get their message to the public. Yet a publishing house does 
not create its own message. It is a conduit for others’ speech. 
Publishing, whether by a formal publishing house or at home, is the 
only way to create a printed message available to the public. 
Similarly, tattooing is also a method that makes a certain type of 
speech possible. It brings that speech into the public arena. But the 
tattooist, just like the publishing house, is not advocating his or her 
own message but is merely providing a way for others to speak. It 
 
 172. Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of N. Chi., 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
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follows that the process of tattooing should thus receive the same 
amount of First Amendment protection as does a publishing house. 
Publishing houses do not create protected speech, but they could 
receive protection from the First Amendment as a conduit for an 
entire type of speech. In Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., the 
Supreme Court applied the First Amendment to a regulation of 
newspaper racks.173 The Court noted that the licensing scheme at 
issue concerning the placement of newspaper racks on public lands 
was directed at “conduct commonly associated with expression.”174 
The Court found that this scheme was still subject to First 
Amendment guarantees because of the potential for censorship of 
expression.175 Likewise, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, the Supreme Court held that the 
First Amendment protected newspaper publications from a special 
use tax on ink and paper.176 Therefore, the tax burdened the printing 
of speech rather than the actual speech. Even though the tax did not 
actually regulate protected speech, the Court found that the tax 
placed “a burden on the interests protected by the First 
Amendment.”177 
Thus, even if the activity at issue isn’t speech itself, an activity 
that usually accompanies expression could receive some First 
Amendment protection. These activities receive protection when the 
action serves to promote or protect “free access of the public to the 
expression.”178 Although the analogy between newspaper racks and 
tattooists is not perfect, tattooists also conduct activity that is usually 
associated with speech but is not speech itself. A tattooist most 
definitely promotes public access to a type of speech because the 
tattooist serves as the way for the public to speak through the 
medium of permanent tattoos. Thus, even though tattooists do not 
speak themselves when tattooing, the practice could still receive 
some First Amendment protection. 
 
 173. Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
 174. Id. at 760. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 
(1983). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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B. Constitutionally Permissible Regulations 
One of the most significant implications of separating the tattoo 
from the process is that tattoos and the tattooing process could 
constitutionally be subject to different types of regulations. The 
tattoo and the process are considered together only if the tattoo is 
pure speech. As a result of analyzing them as one, tattooing would 
then also be pure speech. But when separated from the tattoo, the 
process of tattooing is not pure speech or symbolic conduct and 
deserves protection only as a medium used to convey speech. 
If the debate centered on whether the tattooing process is pure 
speech or symbolic conduct, the answer actually would not have 
much significance as to permissible regulations. If the act of tattooing 
is pure speech and a city attempts to enact a content-neutral 
regulation, such as a requirement of certain safety procedures, the 
test used would be the time, place, and manner test. The regulation 
would have to be tailored to meet a significant government interest 
while leaving open alternative avenues for communication.179 If the 
act of tattooing is symbolic conduct, then any regulation would have 
to pass the O’Brien four-factor test, which requires that an “incidental 
limitation[] on First Amendment freedoms” further “an important or 
substantial government interest” that is “unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression” and is “no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest.”180 While the two tests may employ 
different words, the two amount to approximately the same level of 
scrutiny.181 
Even if the city attempted to regulate the process of tattooing for 
content reasons, any difference between defining tattooing as pure 
speech versus symbolic conduct would be negligible. Regulating 
tattooing for content would mean that the regulation would fail the 
O’Brien test, since O’Brien requires that the regulation be an 
incidental limitation on the First Amendment.182 A content-based 
regulation is a quintessentially nonincidental restriction on 
speech.183 If the O’Brien test is thus not applicable, the regulation 
 
 179. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 180. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). 
 181. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298. 
 182. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 183. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). 
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would be subject to strict scrutiny.184 This is the same standard for a 
content-based regulation of pure speech. Therefore, a choice 
between labeling the tattooing process as pure speech or symbolic 
conduct has few ramifications. 
But if the tattooing process is not speech or symbolic conduct, 
then a very different standard is applied. A lack of First Amendment 
protection for tattooing would mean that any regulations of the 
process of tattooing would only have to pass rational-basis review.185 
Because rational basis only requires a legitimate government 
interest that is reasonably related to the statute,186 almost any 
statute would pass this standard given the health risks of tattooing. 
Generally, tattooing is safe if performed under sterilized 
conditions.187 But tattooing can present serious health risks not 
inherent in other types of art. If unsterile tattooing occurs, the 
recipient is at risk for several infectious diseases, including HIV, 
syphilis, hepatitis B virus, hepatitis D virus, and hepatitis C.188 
Bacterial infections are also a possible hazard.189 Skin reactions to 
the pigments can also occur, ranging from photosensitivity to the 
different pigments to allergic reactions and metal toxicity.190 
Because of these serious health risks, a legislature considering 
regulation of the practice of tattooing could constitutionally pass 
almost any measure if the regulations are only subjected to rational-
basis scrutiny. Indeed, all of the courts that separated the tattooing 
process from the tattoo found that the regulation passed 
constitutional muster.191 Even in White, the court found that a total 
ban on tattooing within the state was still constitutional.192 
 
But the courts that have subjected tattooing solely to rational-
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (D. Minn. 1980). 
 188. Millner & Eichold, supra note 118, at 426; Pérez-Cotapos S. et al., supra note 1, at 35. 
 189. Pérez-Cotapos S. et al., supra note 1, at 34. 
 190. Id. at 35; Millner & Eichold, supra note 118, at 427. 
 191. Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of N. Chi., 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 661 (N.D. Ill. 2008); 
Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1255–56 (D. Minn. 1980); State ex rel Med. Licensing Bd. 
v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 
(1978); State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 424 (S.C. 2002). 
 192. White, 560 S.E.2d at 424. 
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basis review have failed to consider the fact that tattooing is a 
medium for speech. As such, not all regulations may be permitted. 
Because the goal of the First Amendment is to preserve the free flow 
of expression,193 regulations that tend to completely shut off 
mediums for speech or distort the marketplace of ideas have been 
found unconstitutional. Hence, in Lakewood, the Supreme Court 
struck down the licensing scheme because of the potential for 
censorship.194 Because no objective standards existed for the 
granting or refusal of a license, the licensor could potentially grant 
licenses exclusively to messages that he or she agreed with.195 This 
would lead to a distortion of the expression at issue. A licensing 
scheme for tattooing that lacked objective standards unrelated to the 
message of the tattoo would likely be unconstitutional in light of 
Lakewood. 
Likewise, a total ban on tattooing would foreclose an entire area 
of speech and possibly violate the Constitution. Without someone to 
perform the tattooing, potential speakers wouldn’t be able to share 
their message through a tattoo. Shutting off a legitimate form of 
expression is usually an unconstitutional time, place, or manner 
restriction.196 Even so, some bans of an entire medium have been 
upheld by the Supreme Court. In Kovacs v. Cooper, the Court upheld a 
citywide ban on sound trucks as a protection of others from the 
“distracting noises” of the sound trucks.197 The Court noted that this 
legislation did not act as a “restriction upon the communication of 
ideas” through mediums other than sounds trucks.198 This case 
implies that where the medium is one of many available to convey a 
message, a ban may be permissible. But this case would not be 
applicable to tattooing since tattooing is the only means to acquire a 
 
 193. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (The First Amendment “rests 
on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public” and is a “command that the 
government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas.”). 
 194. Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145–49 (1943) (holding a ban on 
door-to-door distribution of literature unconstitutional); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 
451–52 (1938) (holding a ban on distribution of pamphlets within the municipality 
unconstitutional). 
 197. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949). 
 198. Id. 
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tattoo. 
Neither does any other medium convey the same message as the 
tattoo. A temporary tattoo, such as a henna tattoo, cannot 
communicate in the same manner as a permanent tattoo because 
permanence of the tattoo generally plays a large role in the tattoo’s 
overall message.199 Neither would displaying the same design on a t-
shirt or other item of clothing speak in the same manner as a tattoo 
would. As mentioned, part of the tattoo’s meaning is derived from its 
placement on human skin, and so placing that design on inanimate 
clothing simply is not the same. Since tattooing is the only medium to 
convey the message of a tattoo, a ban on the act of tattooing would 
almost certainly be unconstitutional. 
Along these same lines, states or cities that permitted tattooing 
only when performed by a licensed physician would likely also be 
unconstitutional. While the regulation certainly furthers the 
government’s interest in public health, a doctors-only provision 
would severely limit the availability of tattoos and greatly increase 
their cost. It seems unlikely that a tattooist would attend medical 
school to pursue his or her vocation. Nor is it likely that already 
licensed physicians would start specializing in tattooing or even take 
on tattooing as a part-time job. Thus, requiring that only licensed 
physicians perform the act of tattooing would essentially shut down 
an entire medium of expression and would be unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment. 
In contrast, regulations that do not effectively bar all tattooing or 
discriminate based on viewpoint would likely pass constitutional 
muster. Regulations of this type might include statutes that require a 
physician or other health professional to supervise the tattooing or 
strict health regulations of the business and practice of tattooing. It is 
debatable whether requiring health professionals to supervise would 
effectively shut down all tattooing in the way that requiring tattooing 
to be performed by a licensed physician would. Tattoo parlors likely 
would not be able to hire a physician to supervise the work full time; 
but if the physician did not have to be present for the entire process 
or only had to ensure that the tattooist was properly using sterilized 
 
 199. Benson, supra note 151, at 250. (“[I]n tattoo-talk the focus is rather on the body 
as . . . a site for self-realization. And in this, of course the idea of the permanence of the tattoo is 
critical.”). 
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equipment in a safe manner, then it is plausible that tattooing would 
still occur legally. Strict regulations, such as requiring a license or 
mandating the use of certain sterilization procedures and chemicals, 
would not tend to shut down all tattooing or distort the marketplace. 
Thus, these types of regulations would be constitutionally 
permissible due to the important safety issues involved in tattooing. 
C. Implications for Other Collaborative Processes 
It may seem unjust to some that the tattooist’s role is 
downplayed to a service rather than elevated to that of artist, but it is 
consistent with the way we view many other collaborative processes. 
The Anderson court reasoned that “[a]s with all collaborative creative 
processes, both the tattooist and the person receiving the tattoo are 
engaged in expressive activity.”200 This statement is flawed, however. 
Usually collaborative creative processes are not treated as if 
everyone involved was expressing something. A few examples help to 
illustrate this point. 
If all involved in a collaborative process that results in speech are 
“engaged in expression,” some strange (even absurd) results can 
occur. For example, if a person went to a barber to have a phrase or 
name shaved into his head, under this rule, both the barber and the 
customer would be communicating. This seems ridiculous as clearly 
it is the customer’s speech and not the barber’s. The barber may have 
to use his or her creative touch to make the words look nice but he is 
not speaking in the usual sense of the word. He may help another put 
his message out there, but the barber is not the speaker. 
Furthermore, if anyone engaged to help another speak is also 
speaking, then the friend who applies face paint proclaiming support 
for a sports team on another is also speaking. The same goes for the 
person who applies a rub-on tattoo for a friend. These examples may 
seem silly, but they are all logical outgrowths of the Anderson 
rationale. 
In Anderson, the court decries the separation of tattoos and 
tattooing, saying that doing so would provide no protection for the 
process of writing news articles assigned by editors.201 But not 
separating the tattoo from the process raises a potential problem 
 
 200. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 201. Id. 
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about the ownership of the speech. If both the writer and the editor 
are speaking, then do both have claim to the finished article as their 
speech? The Anderson court would likely be hesitant to say so. If the 
article was the editor’s speech as well, then any editor who 
contributed to the article by correcting grammatical errors could 
possibly lay claim to the article as his or her speech. This result is 
avoided by separately analyzing the tattoo and the process of 
tattooing. 
Finally, choosing this separation has implications for another 
area brought into court recently—body piercing as First Amendment 
speech. In recent years, both individuals owning piercing shops and 
those with piercings have claimed First Amendment privileges for 
their right to wear or insert a piercing.202 Just like tattooists, piercers 
claim that body piercing is an art and communicates ideas of body 
ownership.203 If piercings are First Amendment speech, as one 
jurisdiction has found,204 then the Anderson holding would dictate 
that both the customer and the piercer are speaking through the 
resultant piercing. This stretches the First Amendment beyond its  
 
rightful bounds because many piercers are simply performing a 
service rather than communicating themselves. 
In all of these situations, one person communicates and another 
helps that person to communicate. But the giving of aid does not 
necessarily render the helper a speaker for First Amendment 
purposes. Truly, a state could not completely prohibit the hairdresser 
or the face painter from rendering their services if it would prevent 
others from speaking, but it does not mean that they should be 
viewed as speakers themselves. Courts should remember who is 
actually putting forth the message when providing First Amendment 
 
 202. Bar-Navon v. Sch. Bd., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82044, at *9–10 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2007), 
aff’d, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 17562 (11th Cir. Fla., Aug. 15, 2008) (student claiming that body 
piercings were protected expressive conduct); Olesen v. Bd. of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 820, 821 
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (student claiming that school regulation prohibiting male from wearing 
earrings violates his right to free speech); Difeo v. Town of Plaistow, No. 00-E-0218, 2002 N.H. 
Super. LEXIS 20, at *5 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 7, 2002) (owner of piercing shop claiming First 
Amendment protection for the act of body piercing); City of Albuquerque v. Sachs, 92 P.3d 24, 
29 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (owner of piercing establishment claiming that piercing was First 
Amendment speech). 
 203. Sachs, 92 P.3d at 29; Difeo, 2002 N.H. Super. LEXIS 20, at *5. 
 204. Difeo, 2002 N.H. Super. LEXIS 20, at *6. 
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protection. When courts separate the tattoo from the process of 
tattooing, they acknowledge that the wearer of the tattoo is the one 
communicating and thus the one in need of constitutional protection, 
not the tattooist. If the courts do not emphasize the main speaker at 
hand, many others could claim a message as their own even if they 
have not input anything into the actual message at hand. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Tattooing can be a means for a tattooee to communicate a 
message to the general public. Despite court efforts to afford wide 
protection to the tattooing process, the simple truth is that some 
tattoos, such as cosmetic tattoos or self-expression tattoos, are not 
communicative. Thus, tattoos generally cannot categorically be 
labeled pure speech. Because the act of tattooing does not always 
result in pure speech and because it requires little to no creative 
input from the tattooist, the process of tattooing can be treated 
differently from other commissioned arts and can be separated from 
the tattoo for First Amendment purposes. 
Once the tattooing process is separated from the tattoo, it 
becomes obvious that the process cannot qualify as either pure 
speech or symbolic conduct. The tattooist does not convey his or her 
own message through the tattoo, nor would an audience view the 
tattoo as the tattooist’s communication. Tattooing may still receive 
some First Amendment protection as the only means to speak 
through a tattoo, but this protection may allow more rigorous 
regulation than if the process of tattooing was protected speech 
itself. In light of other collaborative processes, this separation  
 
 
becomes necessary to protect the truly dominant speaker and not 
the one who provided the mechanism for speech. 
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